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Laura Valentini’s gracious but incisive response to my criticism helpfully 
clarifies her own position and puts into greater relief the point of contention 
between us. She says that my claim that she rejects global egalitarianism 
is a “misunderstanding” since she only rejects “full-blown cosmopolitan 
equality” and not global egalitarianism as such. However, the basic difference 
between both remains unclear.
I should first note that Valentini’s basic aim in her book, namely to 
discover a distinctive third position, is to be commended and encouraged. In 
fact, bold, ambitious undertakings of this sort, of developing new positions 
or frameworks for assessing lingering problems, is what makes for really 
interesting and engaging philosophical work. So my rejoinder here should 
not be read as a dismissal of her project. To the contrary, I will put pressure 
on her claim in order to encourage more investigation into the possibility of 
a third position on global justice along the lines she suggests.
Her approach to global justice, she stresses, is open to the possibility 
that certain global practices be regulated by egalitarian principles (of the 
sort I hinted at) although she did not argue for them in her book. But if this 
is so, it only reinforces my central objection that her approach to global 
justice is not a distinctive position that provides a third alternative to statist 
humanitarianism and cosmopolitan equality. As she says, my reading of 
her “reveals a deeper disagreement between the two of us”, and this is the 
significant point. This disagreement in the first instance has to do with how 
we characterize cosmopolitan equality and what would make a position 
non-cosmopolitan.
Whether we should call a position “cosmopolitan egalitarian” or not might 
seem to some readers to be a pedantic dispute. But in the context of the 
present discussion this is more than a terminological quibble, for my claim in 
my review is that the interesting and crucial difference between humanitarian 
obligations and cosmopolitan egalitarian obligations reduces to the difference 
between sufficiency and equality (or sufficientarianism and egalitarianism). 
What is substantively at stake in the debate on global distributive justice, 
in fact what I would consider the fundamental challenge, is whether global 
distributive principles should be sufficientarian or egalitarian. Valentini, 
in contrast, takes the dispute to involve not just the pattern of distribution 
228 Kok-Chor Tan
LEAP 2 (2014)
but also the grounds and recipients of distribution. Our disagreement, as 
Valentini also points out, far from being merely semantic, is ultimately a 
disagreement about what is really at issue in the debate.
In my view, Valentini’s position as clarified in her reply is more clearly 
a variant of cosmopolitan egalitarianism. Valentini offers two reasons why 
her position is distinctive from cosmopolitan egalitarianism and occupies 
a middle position. One of them is that she takes the basic recipients of 
distribution to be states. This alone, however, does not make her position 
anti-cosmopolitan since she also conditions the normative standing of 
states on their respecting the equal freedom of their respective individual 
members (freedom here defined as independence). Cosmopolitans do regard 
individuals, in the world as a whole, as the basic units of equal moral concern 
and, in this sense, adopt a normative individualist position. But this does not 
mean that a global distributive principle that takes states to be the recipients 
is non-cosmopolitan, if the qualification of states to be recipients of justice is 
contingent on how they treat individuals within their borders. For instance, 
if states’ normative status as recipients of global justice is conditional 
on the respect for the equal freedom of each individual (as in Valentini’s 
theory), this is not fundamentally distinguishable from the cosmopolitan 
position. Cosmopolitans can allow states to be the main recipients of global 
distribution for a variety of reasons, including administrative, heuristic, or 
appeal to the virtues of a division of labour. Their position remains basically 
cosmopolitan if what fundamentally guides their vision is how individuals 
fare under the distributive arrangement.
Her other reason for distinguishing her position from a cosmopolitan 
egalitarian one is her understanding of the grounds of global obligations. But 
the ground of a principle and the pattern of the principle are distinct, and 
a principle is egalitarian depending on its pattern and not its ground. What 
distinguishes cosmopolitan egalitarianism from statist humanitarianism is 
not that the former is grounded in justice and the latter is not, for it is open 
to humanitarians to say that their minimalist commitments are nonetheless 
obligations of justice (and some will indeed hold this). More to the present 
point, cosmopolitan egalitarianism need not be tied to any particular 
ground of equality. Valentini herself recognizes this (allowing that there can 
be relational and non-relational grounds for cosmopolitan equality), but 
this then only further confirms my point that the ground of a principle is 
distinct from its pattern.
To make my central point from a different direction: Valentini means 
to only reject “full-blown” cosmopolitan equality, meaning by this the 
position that egalitarian principles for the global domain are identical 
to those for the domestic one. That is, on this view, global egalitarianism 
is just domestic egalitarianism writ large. As I noted in my review, while 
this is certainly descriptive of some cosmopolitan egalitarian positions, 
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“full-blown” cosmopolitan equality is only a variant of cosmopolitan 
egalitarianism. Valentini may well be correct that global egalitarian justice 
is not simply domestic justice replicated in the global arena but should 
take the more limited though egalitarian form she suggests. But to claim 
that this is a distinctive (and non-cosmopolitan) position and not just a 
variant of cosmopolitan equality distracts from the key dispute about global 
distributive justice, which is that of sufficiency versus equality. And appealing 
to the dimensions of grounds and recipients does not necessarily provide a 
resolution of this quarrel nor does it bring the two sides to a common middle 
ground. Statist humanitarians can accept that humanitarian obligations 
are obligations of justice but insist that these global obligations remain 
sufficientarian in form; and cosmopolitan egalitarians can accept that states 
are the recipients of distributive justice but insist that the global distribution 
remain egalitarian in form.
In short, Valentini’s thesis that there is a third approach rests on a 
particular characterization of cosmopolitan egalitarianism which includes 
features that are not essential to the view. However, since cosmopolitan 
egalitarianism is neither (i) uniquely based on some specific moral 
grounding nor (ii) incompatible with involving the state in its distributive 
enterprise, Valentini’s acceptance of global distributive principles with 
egalitarian pattern and whose normative starting point is the equal freedom 
of individuals puts her on the cosmopolitan side even though she denies the 
team colours. As noted above, this is not a quibble over a label but a comment 
on what the debate between statist humanitarianism and cosmopolitan 
egalitarianism is really about.
